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EGO CONSTRICTION
Linda A. W. Brakel
The terms ego constriction, ego inhibition, and ego restriction have not been clearly differen-
tiated in their usage in the literature. In this paper a rationale for ‘‘ego constriction’’ as an
entity distinct from both ego inhibition and ego restriction is given, despite its clear similari-
ties to each. In a person with an ego inhibition, the ego inhibits a part of its own functioning
because a particular function is linked to an unacceptable impulse. It is an internalized con-
flict. The person with an ego restriction, in contrast, avoids psychological pain triggered from
an area in the outside world by restricting activity in that area. Like each of these problems
but different, a person with an ego constriction first externalizes an internalized conflict asso-
ciated with important functions or activities. Then, only through a series of particular obliga-
tory steps can the person ‘‘overcome’’ the ego constriction—albeit temporarily. It is noted in
this paper that the function of the specified obligatory steps is structurally parallel to the rigid
obligatory behavior necessary for genital gratification in the perversions. As the recognition
of this distinction arose in the course of an analysis of a mental health professional, some-
thing of the necessarily shared nature of analytic work is noticeable, shining through as the
background for the work of this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
In peer supervision I learned of a case, a part of which I shall present
below. Since both patient and analyst are in our field I have: (1) made
sure that permission from both parties was properly obtained, and (2)
disguised the material to the satisfaction of all participants. The material
warrants publication, despite the obvious difficulties, for two intertwined
reasons. First, the work brings to light a distinct diagnostic entity to my
knowledge heretofore not reported. Second, the manner of the discovery
of this entity demonstrates the shared nature of analytic work—in its
mundane daily aspect at least as much as in its uniqueness.
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CASE MATERIAL
Dr. X, a child psychiatrist in analysis, had been describing a work prob-
lem for several weeks. Although she could see her own patients without
particular difficulty, concisely and helpfully critique articles for her col-
leagues, and even revise her own papers, she could not take steps that
would lead to creative progress in any of her various academic projects.
That is, she could not initiate any such steps; but if a colleague or collab-
orator—for Dr. X all the relevant ones were male—were to express some
interest in a project or make a suggestion, Dr. X would immediately be
able to work intensely and well for some discrete period, after which time
the symptoms would return.
Listening to this, and thinking that X’s work in the analysis also fitted
this pattern, Dr. Y, the analyst, made some comment about what he
called X’s work inhibition. X then said, ‘‘You know, I never really have
grasped the distinction between ‘ego inhibitions’ and ‘ego constrictions’.
And who better to explain it to me than you, since you make such a point
of using terms correctly. You’re sort of well known for saying that small
differences can make a difference—say in terms of two defense mecha-
nisms—if each has a distinct underlying explanatory or functional role.’’
Y hadn’t thought about it directly, but began to articulate the differences
between ‘‘ego inhibition’’ and ‘‘ego constriction’’ for both himself and X.
A person with an ego inhibition has a conflict that renders him/her unable
to accomplish some activity that he/she is quite capable of performing. A
person with an ‘‘ego constriction’’, on the other hand, can perform the
conflicted activity, but only if certain specified conditions are in place.
X and Y both recognized several things and together concluded:
1. X was suffering from an ‘‘ego constriction’’ concerning her work, not
an ego inhibition.
2. The certain specified conditions in X’s situation were always formally
the same, indeed stereotypic: When she was in a non-initiating state
regarding work, she was in a maternal transference. This consisted in
being less-than-she-could-be in order to be able to be with, and to be
like a limited mother. When a father figure expressed interest, X felt
him to be saying, ‘‘It’s OK for you to work like me; to be like me; to
be with me.’’ X could then work with excitement, but soon, perhaps
owing to unconscious guilt at feeling she had supplanted her mother,
especially owing to her hostile aggressive wishes to do just that, the
constriction would return.
3. Perhaps there are always rigidly specified conditions necessary for
successful performance in persons with ‘‘ego constrictions’’. If so
‘‘ego constrictions’’ would be in general structure analogous to
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perversions; the specified necessary conditions for lifting the constric-
tion allowing good functioning analogous to the necessary perverse
conditions for satisfying genital sexual activity in persons with perver-
sions. And indeed X had a longstanding, almost obligatory for orgas-
mic genital gratification, and in this sense perverse, sexual phantasy
in which the same factors present sequentially in the establishing and
relieving of the ego constriction are in the phantasy collapsed
together. Her phantasies always manifestly centered upon having sex-
ual intercourse with a male romantic object clearly representing the
encouraging permissive father. But also the male figure—via shared
specific physical characteristics with X’s mother—stood for X’s
mother, healthy, nondamaged and present.
4. Most strikingly, X had set up a demonstration of ‘‘ego constriction’’ in
the analysis, quite directly. An intermittent worker on her own mate-
rial at best, X had begun this session as many others, with Y in the
not-very competent mother transference and X in the less-than-she-
could-be state. But by asking Y the question about the distinction
between ego inhibition and ‘‘ego constriction,’’ X simultaneously ele-
vated Y to a knowing powerful father ("you’re sort of well known for
saying that small differences can make a difference…’’); and tacitly
criticized him for making the wrong diagnosis (it is ‘‘ego constric-
tion’’ not ego inhibition, isn’t it?), thereby keeping him as the incom-
petent mother. The criticism about Y’s mistake, and the content of
the actual distinction were both unconscious for X, who in this way
kept herself incompetent too. Once Y explained the differences, to
himself and to X, he became the interested father and she the harm-
less (especially to her mother), bright hard-working little girl. With
the rigidly specified conditions for relieving the constriction in place,
X could now work effectively in the analysis, and (for a time) she did
so—viz. her full participation in the material of these listed four
items—demonstrating for both of them in the transference the nature




According to Anna Freud (1971[1970]), inhibitions (she does not refer
to them as ‘‘ego inhibitions’’) are based on conflict (p. 180). At first the
conflict is between prohibited impulse and external objects and the dan-
ger is loss of love or punishment (1981[1972], p. 27). As development
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progresses the conflict is internalized. Inhibitions at this stage (and the
earlier one) are done by the ego and not necessarily to the ego. Once the
inhibition is an internalized process it can be done to impulse or activity
(1981 [1971], p. 154) at the behest of the superego (1981 [1977],
p. 247). Put another way, the situations of danger which occasion conflict
and which therefore lead to the inhibition (1981 [1976], p. 195) now
include superego punishment.
The ego can effect an inhibition in a number of ways, including regres-
sive expression (1981 [1977], p. 248). And there are several general inhi-
bition types—of function (1971 [1968], p. 117; 1970, p. 187), of activity
(1936, p. 128; 1972 [1971], p. 154), and of impulse (1981 [1971],
p. 154). Also, she commented on several specific inhibitions: of speaking
out (1936, p. 117), of sexual behavior (1981 [1975], p. 83, 93), of curios-
ity (1966, p. 68), of touch and motility (1981 [1972], p. 27), of aggressive
instinct and aggression (1972 [1971], p. 154), and of learning, play, and
work (1981 [1971], p. 162; 1965, p. 150).
Differentiating Inhibitions from Ego Restrictions
Freud used the term ‘‘ego restriction’’ not the term ‘‘ego constriction’’
which Y and X both mis-remembered and assumed. Freud (1936) devoted
a chapter The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense to ‘‘ego restrictions’’
and did make a clear distinction between them and inhibitions. In fact
one can have an inhibition and then react to it ‘‘…by a complete with-
drawal of interest from the given area, i.e., by ego restriction…’’(1965,
p. 120). This notwithstanding, Freud also noted that there is a strong out-
ward resemblance between ego restriction and inhibitions of ego function
(1936, p. 109). As for the distinction, she held that in the person with an
(ego function) inhibition, the ego inhibits a part of its own function
because that function is linked to an unacceptable impulse. Because this
process is entirely internal, there are no areas in which this function can
be performed to capacity.
On the other hand, the person with an ego restriction avoids pain from
outside. Here are two examples of the many she offered to illustrate ego
restrictions. The first was a boy in analysis with Freud. When he felt
bested by her at various feats he withdrew to an observing position,
avoiding the activity in question, yet enjoying the observing, and function-
ing well with respect to performing the same activities outside his ses-
sions. The second was a boy who could not stand his success at soccer
for he feared he would be damaged by the bigger boys. He demoted
sports in his life, making them not important to him; and forthwith he
devoted himself to literature at which he started to excel (1936, p. 96-99).
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In these cases since the pain is experienced as arising externally, persons
with an ego restriction can restore function in different external situations.
Now of course with the ex-soccer player, the issues of castration anxiety
and competition with his father arise. But since the castration anxiety and
competition were not joined by the boy’s own aggressive impulses (at
least not in the formation of this symptom), he suffered from an ego
restriction—fixable under different conditions—and not an internally gen-
erated inhibition that follows him everywhere.
Summing up the differences, Freud stated that a person suffering from
an inhibition, ‘‘…is defending against the translation into action of some
prohibited instinctual impulse, i.e., against the liberation of unpleasure
through some internal danger…. In ego restriction, on the other hand, dis-
agreeable external perceptions in the present are warded off, because
they might result in the revival of similar impressions from the past’’
(1936, p. 101).
Other Literature
Do other writers consider ego restriction a discrete phenomenon, as
did Anna Freud? A look first at Moore and Fine (1990) Psychoanalytic
Terms & Concepts, shows that these authors immediately confound the
very distinction Freud drew. Moore and Fine introduce their definition of
the term ‘‘inhibition’’ thus: ‘‘A restriction of an area of ego functioning’’
(p. 99). Moore and Fine do interestingly suggest that some inhibitions/
restrictions can be normal, for example if the ego is somewhat depleted
of energy owing to other more pressing tasks such as the work of mourn-
ing. Do others writers confound ego restriction with ‘‘ego constriction’’ or
with other ego maladies? Is there a distinct entity, ‘‘ego constriction’’? A
search using the PsycINFO Index database of the psychological literature
from 1936 (the publication date of Freud’s The Ego and the Mechanisms
of Defense) to the present, yielded 27 potentially relevant articles with
ego restriction as a key word phrase and 29 with ego constriction.
Looking at the ego restriction articles first: Seven of them (Alpert &
Krown, 1954; Blanchard, 1941; Chauvier, 1989; Elliott, 1982; Hampstead
Clinic, 1984; Sandler, 1982; Thomas, 1997) used ego restriction as Freud
had, and in many cases cited her work. In eight other articles (Altschul,
1968; Khan, 1986; Mahler-Schoenberger, 1942; Mittelmann, 1954;
O’Shaughnessy, 1981; Romanova, 1983; Szyrynski, 1976; Wastell, 1992)
the term ego restriction was used quite specifically, and rather differently,
each from the other and each from Freud’s term. For example Altschul
(1968) wrote of patients who, after sustaining the loss of a parent in their
childhood, suffered a ‘‘restriction in ego development’’ causing an ego
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arrest so that internalized object relations with the parent could remain.
(Citations are quotations from the abstracts in PsychINFO unless other-
wise noted.) Wastell (1992) wrote of ‘‘restriction in merger and separate-
ness’’; Romanova (1983) alluded to ‘‘restriction of temporal perspective’’;
and Szyrynski (1976) discussed children with school phobia caused by
‘‘ego weakness’’ in which the phobic symptom effected ‘‘neurotic restric-
tion of freedom…’’(p. 170). O’Shaughnessy (1981), a Kleinian, referred to
‘‘restricted but tolerable object relations’’ and ‘‘overrestriction versus
under of object relations’’. Mahler-Schoenberger (1942) wrote of children
with ‘‘pathological limitation and restriction of intellectual function’’ (p.
155) in the service of what would otherwise be understood as forbidden
gratificatory participation in the sexual life of their parents. Finally, Khan
(1986) and Mittelman (1954) respectively alluded to the ‘‘restriction of
mobility’’ in 2-year olds, and ‘‘restriction of spontaneity’’. In both of these
articles the restrictions were imposed from the outside and to this extent
not unlike Freud’s use of the term ego restriction.
Of the remaining 12 articles with ego restriction as a key word phrase,
one (Busch, 1989) used the term as Freud would have used ‘‘ego regres-
sion’’; and the last 11 were quite irrelevant to the question at hand, each
in various ways. For example Glover (1943) referred to the ‘‘restriction of
unconscious mechanisms weakening the ego’’; Shanas (1968) talked of a
‘‘restriction of life space’’ in the aged as there is an increasing self-preoc-
cupation; and Alstroem, Nordlund, and Persson (1983) and Persson and
Alstroem (1984) used ego restriction as a global category consisting of a
number of diverse scales measuring, for example, depression, irritability,
and decreased effectiveness (1984, p. 113).
Examining the 29 ego constriction references, a slightly different picture
emerges. Twenty-two articles (Berg and Berg, 1983; Bernabeu, 1958;
Blum, 1968; Curran and Marengo, 1990; Dor-Shav, 1978; Kepecs and
Robin, 1956; Leenars, 1999, 1997, 1991, 1990, 1989a, 1989b; Leenars
and Lester, 1990; Leenars, De Wilde, Wenckstern, and Kral, 2001; Mo-
tanky and Zaks, 1971; Polansky, Boone, DeSaix, and Sharlin, 1971; Puy-
ser, 1977; Ratna and Murthy, 1970; Shows, Gentry, and Wyrick, 1974;
Sudak, Corradi, Martin, and Gold, 1984; Wells, 1988; Wyrick, Gentry,
and Shows, 1977) used ego constriction in a descriptive and general
sense. Of these, the eight papers by Leenar and colleagues (see references
above) used ego constriction as synonymous with general cognitive con-
striction; and similarly Polansky et al. (1971) used ego constriction to
mean intellectual constriction. Five articles (Berg and Berg, 1983; Berna-
beu, 1958; Blum, 1968; Puyser, 1977; Sudak et al., 1984) used the term
to indicate general ‘‘neurotic constriction’’; three (Kepecs and Robin,
1956; Motanky and Zaks, 1971; Wells, 1988) took ego constriction to
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mean general ‘‘emotional constriction’’; and two each discussed ‘‘social
constriction’’ (Shows et al., 1974 and Wyrick et al., 1977) and the
constriction seen in schizophrenia (Curran and Marengo, 1990; Ratna
and Murthy, 1970). Finally Dor-Shav (1978) alluded to ‘‘constriction of
personality’’.
Four articles (Coen, 1994; English, 1988; Kuramochi and Takahashi,
1964; McCarthy, 1990) used the term ‘‘constriction’’ specifically and idio-
syncratically. For example, Coen (1994) referred to the ‘‘constriction of
loving and hating feelings toward patients’’(p. 1107); and English (1988)
discussed ego constriction with respect to psychologically mediated con-
striction of the throat.
Of most interest however, were three articles (Collier, 1956; Goodwin,
1988; Guertin, 1954) in which the term ‘‘ego constriction’’ was used
exactly as Freud would have used ‘‘ego restriction’’. In Collier (1956), a
theoretical paper, primary defenses such as ‘‘ego constriction’’ were seen
to constrict the field of consciousness as a psychological flight mechanism
from external stress (p. 62–163). In Guertin (1954), Patients with organic
brain damage of long standing were seen to react with ‘‘ego constriction’’
when confronted with tasks they correctly perceived would prove reveal-
ing of their defects. (p. 368).
So while many writers do recognize ego restriction in the manner that
Freud did; still more confound ego restriction with other terms, including
ego constriction, as did Drs. Y and X. But is there a distinct entity ‘‘ego
constriction’’? Should there be? It is clear that in not one of these fifty-six
papers, no matter what terms were used, did the authors describe a phe-
nomenon like the one X and Y found unfolding before them—the one
they jointly termed an ‘‘ego constriction’’.
DIAGNOSTIC RECONSIDERATIONS: DR. X
X’s symptom presents an incongruous diagnostic picture. In an impor-
tant way it looks like an ego restriction: The symptom remits with what
seem to be changes in the external environment. And yet in another
important way her symptom looks like an inhibition: Doing well at spe-
cific types of creative work for X is internally equated with aggression
toward maternal objects and this is unacceptable and must be dealt
with from an internal superego viewpoint. How can this puzzle be
explained?
First, it seems that X is at times able to externalize aspects of what
began as an internal inhibition. The male colleagues represent the invit-
ing, but reassuring fathers, who offer a permissive superego stance as
though to say, ‘‘This is OK, you are just going along with me. And this is
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especially safe since you are little (you still can stay with your mother),
and it won’t hurt anyone (your mother) either.’’ When this externalization
is in place X can do her creative work; hence what seemed an internal
inhibition problem can look like an ego restriction. But note that X can
work creatively only when every piece of this externalization is in place.
The practical consequences for Dr. X. are not very heartening. X’s capac-
ity for the work most important to her always deteriorates rather rapidly
because the link between working successfully and hostile aggression
toward maternal objects has not been changed, and the everyday varia-
tions of real world militate against sustaining her externalizations just so.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The theoretical gain from understanding Dr. X’s case can be much
more promising. Based on the collaboration of Drs. X and Y this is what
can now be put together. While there is no place that someone with an
ego function inhibition can use that particular function at capacity, a per-
son with an ego restriction can use the function in question anywhere as
long as the one troublesome area is avoided. X fits neither of these cate-
gories. For X, given that her problem concerns specifically creative work,
every area involved with creative progress is troublesome—save one. She
can only work creatively in one situation, namely one that falls under the
special, rigidly specified circumstances described above. These specified
environmental circumstances serve much like those necessary for gratifi-
cation in persons with a perversion. Thus X suffers from an ego constric-
tion. And ‘‘ego constriction’’ warrants classification as a distinct entity. It
is structured like a perversion, resembling both an ego function inhibition
and an ego restriction, but it is significantly different from both. Y and X
inadvertently found, and then continued to use the term ‘‘ego constric-
tion’’ to better fit a symptom complex whose function cannot be ade-
quately accounted for by considering it either an ego restriction or an
inhibition.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Clinically, the distinction among ego inhibition, ego restriction, and
ego constriction, is useful, not in terms of technical changes, but more in
the realm of expectations. An ego constriction, structured like a perver-
sion, will likely take longer to address analytically, much as perversions
often do compared with neurotic conflicts. But is that important enough
clinically to justify ‘‘ego constriction’’ as a new entity?
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My view is that there is warrant to consider ego constriction a distinct
entity, but not because this will yield clear clinical advantage. Rather,
ego constriction should be distinguished from the two look alike enti-
ties—ego inhibition and ego restriction, because each has a different
underlying foundational structure. Psychoanalysis is a comprehensive the-
ory of mind, not just a mode of clinical practice, and there is a clear
theoretical advantage in specifying, in as much detail as possible, such
distinctions where they exist. This was true in Anna Freud’s day; and it is
(or at least should be) no less true today.
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